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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOEL SILL,
Plaintiff-Counterclaim
Defendant/Appellant,
*

Case No. 20050245-CA

v.
BILL HART d/b/a HART
CONSTRUCTION,
Defendant-Counterclaimant/
Appellee.

*

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is plaintiff-counterclaim defendant Joel Sill's appeal from a final judgment
entered by the district court after a jury trial on the parties' competing breach-ofcontract/unjust enrichment claims and defendant-counterclaimant Bill Hart dba Hart
Construction's mechanic's lien foreclosure action. This Court has jurisdiction over the
appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred in not dismissing
Bill Hart's mechanic's lien foreclosure action based on his failure to comply with UTAH
CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001) when he served his counterclaim complaint on Sill,
and in awarding Hart prejudgment interest and attorney fees in that action.

Sill preserved that issue for review in his post-verdict memorandum responses to
Hart's motion for entry of judgment, decree of foreclosure, and award of prejudgment
interest, attorney fees and costs (R. 1369-79, 1411-20).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-ll(4)(a) & (e) (2001)1:
(a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this
chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, the lien
claimant shall include with the service of the complaint on the owner of
the residence:
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the owner's
rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien
Recovery Fund Act; and
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable
the owner of the residence to specify the grounds upon which the owner
may exercise available rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act.
* * *

(e) If a lien claimant fails to provide the owner of the residence the
instructions and form affidavit required by Subsection 4(a), the lien
claimant shall be barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the
residence.

1

The version of § 38-1-11, as set forth here, was the version in effect in 2002 when
Hart served his counterclaim complaint on Sill. In 2004, the legislature amended that
section. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-11 (Supp. 2004). None of the amendments,
however, is relevant to the issue before this Court, which must only construe the
version of Subsection (4) of 38-1-11 that was in place in 2002 (Subsection (4) was
enacted in 2001, effective April 30, 2001). Accordingly, all citations to § 38-1-11(4)
that appear in this brief are to that version.
9

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
The parties entered into an agreement by which Hart, a general contractor, was

to build a home for Sill in The Colony subdivision in White Pine Canyon ("the
Project"), and Sill was to pay him for that. The Project was to consist of a main house,
an apartment attached to the main house, a garage, and a guesthouse. Hart also was to
build a barn for Sill. Hart began construction in June 1999 and continued until
approximately November 2001, when he left the job based on a disagreement with Sill
concerning completion of the Project. At that point, Sill had paid Hart $2,598,871.
Thereafter, Sill paid others to complete the Project. (R. 1-33, 1050-52).
Sill sued Hart, and Hart counterclaimed. The principal claims advanced by the
parties were based in contract, with Sill seeking to recover damages he contended
resulted from Hart's failure to complete the Project as agreed upon by the parties, and
Hart counterclaiming for money he alleged Sill still owed him under their agreement.
Hart also sued to foreclose on the mechanic's lien he had filed against Sill's property.
(R. 1-33, 59-81).
The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Hart of
$314,500.00 on his unjust enrichment and mechanic's lien claims. Hart sought to
reduce the verdict to judgment. Sill opposed that effort in one major respect, arguing
that Hart's mechanic's lien action was barred (the court lacked jurisdiction to hear it)
because Hart had failed to comply with UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001) when

he served his counterclaim complaint on Sill. Sill argued that Hart therefore was not
entitled to foreclosure on his mechanic's lien or awards of prejudgment interest and
attorney fees, the only basis for awards being the favorable verdict for Hart on his lien
foreclosure action. (R. 1244-88, 1369-79, 1411-20).2
The trial court rejected Sill's arguments and entered judgment on the jury's
verdict in Hart's favor, including the lien foreclosure action. (Judgment, Addendum
1). The court awarded Hart prejudgment interest and attorney fees under the statutory
provision that permits an award of fees to the prevailing party in a mechanic's lien
foreclosure action (UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-18(1) (2001)). In rejecting Sill's challenge
to the lien action, the court said:
Hart readily admits that he did not serve the papers referenced [in
§ 38-1-1 l(4)(a)] on Sill. He also readily admits that he is not entitled to
recover either prejudgment interest or attorney's fees on his unjust
enrichment claim. But he vigorously disputes the notion that Subsection
(4) applies to this dispute.
Both parties acknowledge that Subsection (4) is essentially
dispositive of this issue and, therefore, contend that the Subsection's plain
and unambiguous language requires the Court to rule in their favor.
According to Sill, Hart's filing of his counterclaim constituted "fil[ing] an
action to enforce a lien" and triggered the notice obligations set forth in
Subsection (4). Not so, according to Hart; Subsection (4) applies, he
asserts, only if a lien claimant "files an action" and serves a "complaint"
(versus a counterclaim) on a homeowner. Hart is correct.

2

The parties had reserved for post-verdict determination any issues concerning Hart's
compliance with the statutory requirements for maintaining and enforcing a mechanic's
lien. Stipulation on Mechanic's Lien Issues (R. 1050-52).
d

Memorandum Decision (hereafter "Decision," copy contained in Addendum 2) at 2-3
(R. 1463-64).
B.

Statement of Relevant Facts
It is undisputed that when Hart served his counterclaim complaint3 (setting forth

the mechanic's lien foreclosure action) on Sill in 2002, Hart did not include with the
service of the counterclaim the instructions and forms described in UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001). Decision at 2. That is the principal fact relevant to the issue
presented for review.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001), a provision within Utah's
mechanic's lien statutes, a lien claimant who files an action against a homeowner to
enforce a mechanic's lien must serve on the owner certain instructions and forms with
the complaint that initiates the action. If the lien claimant fails to do that, the claimant
is barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien. § 38-1-1 l(4)(e). In short, Subsection

3

The term "counterclaim complaint" is used throughout this brief to refer to Hart's
pleading containing his mechanic's lien foreclosure claim (just as that term was used
below in Sill's briefing to the trial court). The courts routinely use "counterclaim
complaint" in this fashion. See, e.g., Berckeley Investment Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 259
F.3d 135, 138 (3rd Cir. 2001) ("Colkitt reasserted those counterclaims not dismissed
with prejudice in an amended counterclaim complaint"); Foundation for Interior Design
Educ. Res. v. Savannah College of Art & Design, 244 F.3d 521, 531 (6th Cir. 2001)
("College alleged in its counterclaim complaint * * *"); Federal Kemper Life Assur.
Co. v. Ellis, 28 F.3d 1033, 1038 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Defendant then filed a motion for
leave to file an answer and amended counterclaim complaint"). The Utah Supreme
Court used the term in a recent decision. Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, f 1, 67 P.3d
1000 ("she has filed a motion to intervene and an amended counterclaim complaint").
c

(4)(a) of 38-1-11 is a jurisdictional provision, and a lien claimant's failure to comply
with its requirements deprives a court of jurisdiction to hear the claimant's lien
foreclosure action.
In the instant case, Hart, a lien claimant who brought an action to foreclose on
the mechanic's lien he had filed against property owned by Sill, did not include the
instructions and forms identified in Subsection (4)(a) with the counterclaim complaint
(setting forth the lien foreclosure action) he served on Sill. Under the plain language of
Subsection (4)(a), Hart was required to do that. The trial court therefore lacked
jurisdiction to hear Hart's lien action and should have dismissed it. The court,
however, erroneously construed Subsection (4)(a) to not apply to Hart's counterclaim
complaint and improperly entered judgment in Hart's favor on the lien action.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the judgment in favor of Hart on the lien
action and the awards of prejudgment interest and attorney fees to Hart, the only basis
for those awards being the erroneous judgment on the lien action.
ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in not dismissing - for lack of jurisdiction - Hart's
mechanic's lien foreclosure action based on his failure to comply with UTAH CODE
ANN. § 38-l-ll(4)(a) (2001) when he served his counterclaim complaint on Sill.
A.

Standard of Review
The trial court's determination that it had jurisdiction to consider Hart's

mechanic's lien foreclosure action presents a question of law; therefore, this Court
reviews that decision for correctness, owing the trial court no deference. State v. Lara,

, JMM in"! App 318, 1 10. 79P.3d 951 ("Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction
I11 I ifiKj'slti HI nil 11 ' milli;,11 wt: renew Im correctness,1"'!
interpretation of a slalute piesrnls i qiirstnHI JI Ul\

I'urther, the trial court's

it,

v\r\\{*i) '"• . n p n l i u ' v ,

i1""'<l"" """

i Suit t tike County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999).
B.

Under the plain language of 1JTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-ll(4)(a) & (e) (2001),
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Hart's mechanic's lien
foreclosure action; therefore, that action should have been dismissed and
H a r t ' s request for awards of prejudgment interest and attorney fees denied.
The issue on appeal is straightforwnnl

Did (lie nil il r MIII rir in nuiclinliiig llui

with respect to Hart's mechanic's lien foreclosure action, he was not required to
comply with UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1 * " * Va) (2001) v 1-n he served his counterclaim
complain! < II Sill

I'lic resolution ol that issue is critical (o dclwiiiiiiinj?, whether Hart is

entitled lo n v o v n pivjiidpnnil n i l n n l mil .ilMni,^, (ITS llieir IKIIIJ: IIM -ilispuli1 1L1I
Hart's entitlement to both rests on his having M valid lien foreclosure .i.

i

In "JIN u t, '

if the trial court incorrectly construed § 38 1 1 l(4)(a) as inapplicable u. Hart's
counterclaim complaint, he is not entitled to recover either prejudgment interest or
attorney fh^.
1.

The statutory scheme

To fully underlain! ihe issue presented lor re\ievv, one must first examine the
statutory scheme tin. eg i Mature has adopted w:th respect to providing homeowners
iiulur il 11 it*i

.

i......

f*LAs

intending

agaiii.^; niur propertv

•• )h. .<—ut

i

relationship between a contractor and a homeowner, the legislature enacted the
following provision requiring an original contractor to include such notice in the written
contract with the owner:
Beginning July 1, 1995, the original contractor or real estate
developer shall state in the written contract with the owner what actions
are necessary for the owner to be protected under Section 38-11-107 from
the maintaining of a mechanic's lien or other civil action against the
owner or the owner-occupied residence to recover monies owed for
qualified services.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-11-108(1) (2001).
The legislature's intent to require a contractor to give notice of the statutes
providing a homeowner protection from mechanic's liens is further reflected in the lien
notice provision, which again requires a contractor, who is filing a mechanic's lien, to
inform the homeowner of those statutes:
(2) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall contain a statement
setting forth:
# * *

(h) if the lien is on an owner-occupied residence, as defined in
Section 38-11-102, a statement describing what steps an owner, as defined
in Section 38-11-102, may take to require a lien claimant to remove the
lien in accordance with Section 38-11-107.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-7(2)(h) (2001).4

4

The version of § 38-1-7 in effect at the time Hart filed his lien notice is set forth
here. That section was amended in 2004, and Subsection (2)(h) was renumbered
(2)(a)(ix). The content of the subsection was not changed. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 381-7 (Supp. 2004).
R

Finally, the legislature adopted the strictest, notice requirement for a lien claimant
in ii pit vision addressing (lie lini daiiiuiif :\ IIIMIJJ, ol ,m JIUOII against a homeowner to
enforce a mechanic's lien:
(V I r :ir claimant files an action n> enforce a lien filed nnder this
chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 38 i ; 102 die hen
claimant shall include ^ ith Hie MM-\ it c of the complaint on »he o\\ PAT *.>f
the r-^iden- •
(ij iiihi.ci^inhi^ it- ...i t»wiKi t»> me ICMUCI.''.
rights under Title 38, C-iapi'"* 1 ' P.-^I'MH.,* ? ;.,.*
Recovery Fund Act; and

me owner's
: r j * :,.,«

(ii) a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable
the owner of the residence to specify the grounds upon winch the owner
' may exercise available rights under Title 38, Chapiei .
uienee Lien
• Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act.
* * *

i.e.* 11 a lien ouinant fails to proMu-. ;::* j w n a o. :,,*, ic^\ai\u
instructions and lurai alTidau-: required b\ Subsection 4<a>. the hen
claimant shall be barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the
residence.
in Ml m m ANN «"', W
' S il i i(-nia) & (e) (2o01^ Subsection (4)(a) requires the lien
claimanl win* ait S I

nlon \ lln In i I | n ulr fin: IMUIIUMMIU vi, illi certain

actions and forms concerning an owner's rights to removal ol Hie lini under Hie
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act (hereafter "Residence Lien
^.r-MA/iion t4^e) makes clear that a lien claimant's failure to provide a
i iorm affidavit required by Subsection (4)(a)"
bars enioice:in

•

:

.^

il kn l.n'iiloi. enienl \u imisdietional,

Q

based on a failure to satisfy a statutory precondition to suit. See Beaver County v. Utah
State Tax Commission, 919 P.2d 547, 552 (Utah 1996) (whether a statutory procedural
requirement is jurisdictional depends on whether it is "mandatory" (jurisdictional) or
merely "directory" (not jurisdictional)); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 249-50
(Utah 1988) (Governmental Immunity Act's notice requirement for filing suit against a
governmental entity is a precondition to suit; failure to satisfy a precondition to suit
deprives the trial court of jurisdiction).
As previously noted, in the trial court Sill argued that, under Subsection (4)(e),
Hart's failure to include with the service of his counterclaim complaint the instructions
and affidavit referenced in Subsection (4)(a) required dismissal of his lien foreclosure
action and denial of his requests for prejudgment interest and attorney fees.
Specifically, Sill argued that the commonly accepted definitions of the terms "action"
and "complaint," as used in Subsection (4)(a), include a counterclaim, and thus Hart
was required to comply with Subsection (4)(a)'s notice requirements when he served his
counterclaim complaint on Sill. The trial court disagreed.
2.

The plain meaning of the terms "action" and "complaint," and the
purpose of Subsection (4) (a)

The trial court rejected Sill's argument concerning Subsection (4)(a) on the
ground that the term "complaint," as used in that provision, is not reasonably
interpreted to include a counterclaim. It reasoned:
The plain language of Subsection (4) compels the conclusion that
the Utah Legislature limited the obligation of a lien claimant to serve a
10

homeowner with the materials referenced in Subsection (4)(a) to those
instances in which the lien claimant was initiating an action through
service of a complaint and not a counterclaim. First, while "[t]he word
'action' without more is arguably broad enough to encompass any type of
judicial proceeding, including counterclaims" (Local Union No. 38, Sheet
Metal Workers' Int'l v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73, 81 (2nd Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted)), read in the context of Subsection (4), it is qualified by the
reference to "service of the complaint." Second, this reference to a
complaint is to a pleading that is filed at the commencement of a lawsuit
and that is commonly under stood to be distinct from a. counterclaim.. See,
e.g., Local Union No, 38, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l i \ Pelella, 350 F.3d
at 82; see also Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ? < "A civil action is
commenced (1) by filing of a complaint . . . , or (2) by service of a
summons together with a copy of the complaint") & 7(a) (distinguishi^.
complaint from other pleadings). Third, had the Legislature intended
- ""s construction, it could have easily provided for it (e.g., by
•Ntituting the words "initial pleading" for "complaint" in Subsection
< 4Xa)).
Decision at 3 (footnotes omit(ctl)
Relying lieu fi", on "I'lit* ,S"n»nil >

.

Sheet Metal Workers Int7 v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73 (T

*
l

'>•

'

ided

that a narrow construction of the term "complaint" (not to include a counterclaim) is in
harmony with the mechanic's lien statutes "general purpose * * * 'to provide protection
! lliust Jiu Liiliaiin iilin \ ilin

I i pinpi in) I supplying labor or mate* .w « "

Decision at 4 ('qui >t i m\ - AAA Fencing Compt my i Rainti ee De i }elopment i ini / Energy
Company, 714 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1986)). The court believed "Sill's construction [of
'complaint'] is contrary to the lien law's overarching purpose." /< 1, at 5 1:1 9. Citing
ii'li'ii majont) opinion 111 /V/«'//i/, itic court also loimd, as additional support for its
mmm iiiicrprdafiii

nt <
' IHMJJI.MIH ,' ih;H "llu1 ronmih Ihil Subsection (4) guard

11

against are lessened when the homeowner has demonstrated a certain familiarity with
the legal process by instituting suit against a lien claimant." Id. at 4 n.5.
The problems with the trial court's analysis begin with its notion that the
requirements of Subsection (4)(a) are somehow tempered by the mechanic's lien
statutes' "overarching purpose" to protect those who have enhanced the value of a
property by supplying materials or labor. While that purpose is clear, it does not
permit a court or a lien claimant to ignore prominent procedural requirements within
the statutory scheme that plainly are intended to provide protection for the homeowner
as opposed to the lien claimant. See First General Services v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480,
486 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("Of course, 'compliance with the [mechanics' lien] statute
is required before a party is entitled to the benefits created by the statute.'" (quoting
AAA Fencing Company v. Raintree Development and Energy Company, 714 P.2d 289,
291 (Utah 1986)). Those requirements are noted above, and Subsection (4)(a)
undeniably falls into the category of provisions intended to protect the homeowner from
an improper mechanic's lien through a requirement that the lien claimant inform the
owner of rights under the Residence Lien Act when a lien enforcement action is
initiated. The clear purpose of (4)(a) is to ensure that when a lien claimant sues a
homeowner to enforce a lien, the owner is fully informed of those rights.
The trial court narrowly interpreted the term "complaint" in Subsection (4)(a) to
mean only an initial complaint filed by a lien claimant as a plaintiff, and not to include
a lien claimant's counterclaim complaint filed in response to an owner's suit against the
10

lien claimant. To accept the court's narrow interpretation of "complaint," one must
•• - -

•

-

: *lv unreasonable, conclusion: The

legislature, concerned about protecting ;i homcoww i "M IIJ .his, iiifnidal l'» ICIJUIM ::i lini
claimant to inform the homeowner of rights under the Residence Lien Act at I lit"
contracting stage (§ 38-1 M08HV> r -V notice-of-lien Mage (§ *8-l 7(2)(h)), and
iiiwll) , I (In* iHigal'irii ..a...

s

homeowner - bu«

.

sd))

when UR i*en claimant sues the

• -

•

iction as an

original plaintiff rather than as a counterclaimant. I hat construe:(ion, w Im d as
explained below is not in harmony with the commonly accepted meaning of the terms
" in iMiii iiiiii i iiiiiii|ilniiii

and the context in which they are UM^ '*-. Subsection (4)(a),

defen?

to ensure that a homeowner is

informed of the Residence Lien Act rights af (lie (inn „i hi in uliiiin.iiii MM--,, in I-HIUM V a
mechanic's lien. It is illogical to conclude that the legislature, with that protective
purpose in mind, intended to draw a distinction between ;> Men enforcement action
IHOIIL'III

in iin ongini.iI n IIIII[il.imiirii ililai In ihe lien claimant as a plaintiff and the very

same action brought by the lien n t u n y in IIIIII ,I < mmcii in IIIIII

I in

n< i mi1, IIIIII picciseiy

the same position in each scenario: the defendant in an action broughi In ' Mir lie,
claimant to enforce a mechanic's lien.
construing a statute h f o give effect- tr l i e legislature's intent
in light c

>
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the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony
with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003
UT 12, 1 17, 66 P.3d 592. Additionally, "[i]t is axiomatic that a statute should be
given a reasonable and sensible construction and that the legislature did not intend an
absurd and unreasonable result." State ex rel. Div. of Consumer Prot. v. GAF Corp.,
760 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah 1988). To construe Subsection (4)(a) as the trial court did
here defeats the obvious legislative intent to provide certain informational protection to
a homeowner who is sued by a lien claimant to enforce the lien, and thus the court
violated the foregoing principles of statutory construction.
The court's contention that the concerns Subsection (4)(a) guards against are
lessened when a homeowner sues the lien claimant first and the lien enforcement action
is brought as a counterclaim is unpersuasive. Without explanation, the court concluded
that a plaintiff homeowner "has demonstrated a certain familiarity with the legal
process by instituting suit against a lien claimant," and thus may be presumed not to
require the information referenced in Subsection (4)(a). Decision at 4 n.5. Why that
would be so is not at all clear. For example, the mere fact that a homeowner brings a
breach-of-contract action against a contractor, as Sill did here, provides no basis for
concluding that such an owner therefore has a better understanding of a homeowner's
rights under the Residence Lien Act than would an owner who is sued as a defendant in
an action filed first by a lien claimant as a plaintiff to enforce a mechanic's lien.

14
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Second, the term "complaint," which appears after the phrase "an action to
enforce a lien filed under this chapter" in Subsection (4)(a), must be interpreted with
reference to that preceding phrase. As this Court has said, "courts typically construe
statutes on the assumption that 'each term is used advisedly and that the intent of the
Legislature is revealed in the use of the term in the context and structure in which it is
placed:" State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 994 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Ward v.
Richfield City, 716 P.2d 265, 266 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added by this Court)). It is
with that principle in mind that the meaning of the term "complaint," as used in
Subsection (4)(a), must be determined.
Again, Subsection (4)(a) reads:
If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this
chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, the lien
claimant shall include [certain instructions and forms] with the service of
the complaint on the owner of the residence^]
Central to that provision is the filing of an "action" by a lien claimant to enforce a lien,
and thus the term "complaint" must be read in that context. "Complaint" plainly refers
to the vehicle by which the lien claimant files the "action," which, as previously noted,
this Court has held includes a counterclaim.
Because "complaint" is not defined in Subsection (4)(a), this Court "look[s] to
its commonly understood meaning." State v. Winward, 907 P.2d 1188, 1191 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995). The commonly accepted meaning of "complaint," when used as a legal
term, is found in Black's Law Dictionary 303 (8th ed. 2004): "The initial pleading that

starts a civil action and states the basis foi the court's jurisdiction, the basis for the
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plaintiff in his own right." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Moreover, that interpretation advances the clear legislative purpose of Subsection (4)(a)
to ensure that a homeowner is informed of rights under the Residence Lien Act when a
lien claimant sues the owner to enforce a mechanic's lien.
The trial court's heavy reliance on Pelella, a split-panel decision from the
Second Circuit, to arrive at the opposite conclusion is misplaced. The court first cited
Pelella, 350 F.3d at 82, for the proposition that a complaint is distinct from a
counterclaim. While the Pelella majority does draw that distinction in construing the
statutory phrase "to institute an action" as not including a counterclaim, its analysis is
not helpful in construing Subsection (4)(a) in this case. In American Rural Cellular,
this Court construed the term "action" as used in the mechanic's lien statutes to include
a counterclaim. That, not Pelella, is the controlling authority, along with Harmon v.
Yeager, where the Utah Supreme Court stated, without qualification, that "[a]
counterclaim is viewed as an original action, instituted by the defendant against the
plaintiff and is tested by the same tests and rules as a complaint." That view runs
counter to the Pelella majority's conclusion that "a defendant does not 'institute' an
action when he asserts a counterclaim." 350 F.3d at 82 (cited with approval by the
trial court, Decision at 4).6

6

In a well-reasoned opinion, the dissenting judge in Pelella concluded that "the right
'to institute an action' includes the right to assert a counterclaim." 350 F.3d at 92
(Straub, J., dissenting).
18

The trial court attempted to distinguish the statutory language interpreted in
American Rural Cellular from that used in Subsection (4)(a), noting that "there are no
words or phrases in [§ 38-1-18] that restrict the word 'action' in any way" and that
§ 38-1-18 "references 'any action.'" Decision at 3 n.3. The flaw there is that in
American Rural Cellular this Court did not give any significance to the modifier "any"
in front of the word "action." Indeed, the Court specifically said that a counterclaim to
foreclose a lien "clearly qualifies as 'an action brought to enforce any lien' under the
mechanics' lien statute." 939 P.2d at 193 (emphasis added). The words "an action"
are precisely the words used in Subsection (4)(a), and they operate to compel a broad
interpretation of the word "complaint," which follows the phrase "an action to enforce
a lien," and must be construed in light of the meaning of that phrase. Given the
structure of the sentence in which "complaint" is used, it simply is not reasonable to
conclude, as the trial court did, that the word "complaint" serves to restrict the term
"action," such that "action" does not include the counterclaim this Court said it did in
American Rural Cellular. See, e.g., Wilson v. Baldwin, 519 S.E.2d 251, 253 (Ga.
App. 1999) (noting that the term "complaint" equates with the term "counterclaim" for
purposes of the statute in issue); Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 533 F.Supp. 1122,
1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("The City's argument that section 203(c) does not apply
because the statute uses the term "complaint," whereas in the instant case Brink's is
attempting to assert the recoupment against a "counterclaim" is without merit; indeed,
it borders on the frivolous.").
10

Finally, the trial court erroneously factored into its analysis that Sill ultimately
was not eligible for any relief under the Residence Lien Act. The court viewed Sill's
proposed construction of Subsection (4)(a) as "an interpretation that would restrict
Hart's ability to recover for an otherwise valid lien based on Hart's failure to provide
notice of an irrelevant statutory provision." Decision at 5 n.6. That view, however,
simply reflects the court's disagreement with a legislative policy decision (i.e., to
require a lien claimant to give the Subsection (4)(a) notice to a homeowner who is sued
by the lien claimant to enforce a mechanic's lien, whether or not the owner ultimately is
eligible for relief under the Residence Lien Act). Such disagreement has no place in
the process of statutory interpretation. See Gottling v. P.R. Incorporated, 2002 UT 95,
f 23, 61 P.3d 989 ("Indeed, this court cannot ignore or strike down an act because it is
either wise or unwise. The wisdom or lack of wisdom is for the legislature to
determine. We need not agree with the legislature as a matter of public policy. . . .
What the legislature 'should' do is not the question. Rather it is what the legislature
has done." (citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted)).
At bottom, whether or not a homeowner is in a position to exercise rights under
the Residence Lien Act is irrelevant to this Court's determination of what legislative
intent the unambiguous language of Subsection (4)(a) reflects. Obviously, the
legislature did not want the lien claimant deciding whether the homeowner in a given
case is eligible for relief under the Residence Lien Act; it wanted to ensure that the
sued owner would be the one making that determination, informed by the instructions

and forms served in compliance with Subsection (4)(a). Imparting notice of rights to
the target owner is the clear purpose of (4)(a), and this Court must construe it
accordingly. See State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, 1 25, 4 P.3d 795 ("[0]ur primary goal
in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the
plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve.").
In sum, considering the plain meaning of the key terms in Subsection (4)(a) and
the structure of that provision, along with the clear legislative purpose to protect the
homeowner through the required notice of rights, Hart was required to comply with
Subsection (4)(a)'s notice requirements when he served his counterclaim complaint on
Sill. Hart's failure to do so barred his mechanic's lien foreclosure action. The trial
court erred in concluding otherwise.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should reverse the trial court's
judgment in favor of Hart on his mechanic's lien foreclosure action, which should be
dismissed. The Court also should reverse the trial court's awards of prejudgment
interest and attorney fees to Hart, the only basis for which are the favorable judgment
on the lien action. Finally, based on those reversals, the Court should remand the case
to the trial court with directions to award Sill his reasonable attorney fees and costs in
defending against Hart's invalid lien action at trial and on appeal, which Sill is entitled
to under § 38-1-18(1).

01

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Because this case presents the first opportunity for a Utah appellate court to
interpret § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) with respect to a counterclaim filed by a lien claimant, the
Court should hear oral argument.
Dated this 2-8 day of June 2005.

DAVID B. THOMPSON
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Defendant/Appellant
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P. Bruce Badger, #4791
Robert J. Dale, #0808
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, P.C.
215 South State, Twelfth Floor
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0210
Telephone: (801)531-8900
Facsimile:
(801)531-1716
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant/Third-Party Plaintiff Bill Hart
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOEL SILL,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,

FINAL JUDGMENT, ORDER AND
DECREE OF FORECLOSURE

vs.
BILL HART, d/b/a HART CONSTRUCTION,
Defendant/Counterclaimant,
Civil No. 020500012
BILL HART, d/b/a HART CONSTRUCTION,
Judge Deno G. Himonas
Third Party Plaintiff,
v.
KALLIE J. SILL, and DOES I-X,
Third Party Defendants.

The Jury having rendered its verdict in this action on October 22, 2004, and the court
having fully considered Defendant, Coimterclaimant and Third Party Plaintiff Bill Hart's Motion
for Entry of Judgment Upon a Verdict and For Decree of Foreclosure, Award of Prejudgment
Interest, Attorneys Fees and Costs, three supporting joint affidavits in support of motion for
award of attorneys fees, Amended Verified Memorandum of Costs, and the related motion
papers, and having fully considered Plaintiffs opposing memoranda, and having heard oral
argument from Plaintiffs and Defendant's respective counsel on January 31, 2005, and being
otherwise fully advised in the premises, now enters judgment consistent with the court's
Memorandum Decision entered February 4, 2005.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, DECREED AND DECLARED
as follows:
1.

Bill Hart is awarded judgment in his favor and against Joel Sill, whose address is

28 White Pine Canyon Road, Park City, Utah 84060, in the amount of $314,500, plus
prejudgment interest of $98,480.88, plus costs of $5,598.92, plus reasonable attorneys fees in the
amount of $199,225.75, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18, which are taxed as costs in this
matter, for a total judgment of $617,805.55.
2.

This judgment shall bear interest from entry hereof at the post-judgment rate

specified in Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4(3).
3.

The Notice of Lien dated January 30, 2002, recorded on January 31, 2002, as

Entry 00609900, in Book 1432, Page 511-512, of the official records of the Summit County
Recorder, is a valid and enforceable lien against the property located in Summit County, State of

125400-1

?

Utah, described as follows (the "Property"), and Defendant Bill Hart is entitled to a foreclosure
of his lien on the Property:
All of Homestead No. 15, The Colony At White Pine Canyon, Phase 1
Amended Final Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof on
file and of record in the office of the Summit County Recorder.
Also together with and subject to all rights, benefits, encumbrances
and obligations set forth in the grant of easements recorded September
28,1998 as Entry No. 518627 in Book 1186 at Page 128 of the official
records.
Parcel#CWPC-15-AM
4.

The Property is hereby foreclosed pursuant to Defendant's lien, and the Property,

or such amounts as may be sufficient to pay the amounts due under this judgment and decree,
together with accruing costs and interest, be sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Summit
County, State of Utah, in the manner prescribed by Utah law for the sale of real property as in
the case of foreclosure of mortgages. Plaintiff Joel Sill, and Third Party Defendants, including
Kallie J. Sill, and each of them, and all persons and entities claiming by, through or under them
or any of them, have no further estate, right, title, lien, or other interest of any kind in, on, or to
the Property, except a right of redemption as the case may be as provided by law. Provided,
however, that the Property be foreclosed and sold subject to any unnamed, non-party person or
entity that holds any mortgage or interest that is prior to the interests of Defendant. Any party to
this action may bid for the Property at the sale.
5.

That all persons claiming under Plaintiff Joel Sill or Third Party Defendant Kallie

Sill, whose interests do not appear of record in the Summit County Recorder's Office as of

325400-1

Defendant's filing of the lis pendens of this action, are barred and foreclosed of all right, title,
interest and equity of redemption in the Property.
6.

The Sheriff, upon sale of the Property, shall distribute the proceeds from the sale

as follows:
a. to pay the Sheriffs cost of sale, disbursements and commissions;
b. to pay to Bill Hart or his attorneys the accrued and accruing costs and
attorneys fees of this action, together with the remaining amounts owing Bill Hart for the
total judgment as set forth in paragraph 1 above;
c. any surplus after payment of the amount set forth above be accounted for and
paid over by the Sheriff to the Clerk of Court pending further order by this Court.
7.

The person or entity purchasing the Property at the sheriffs sale thereof shall

receive a Certificate of Salefromthe sheriff and shall, subject to the rights of redemption, be
entitled to immediate possession of the Property and therightto receive and collect all rents
therefrom.
8.

After the time allowed by law for redemption has expired, the Sheriff shall

execute and deliver a Sheriffs Deed (the "Deed") to the purchaser at the sheriffs sale or the
person entitled thereto, as provided for by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The grantee named
therein shall thereupon be entitled to and have possession of the Property.
9.

Defendant Bill Hart is hereby awarded a deficiency judgment against Plaintiff

Joel Sill for any and all deficiencies remaining due after applying the net proceeds derived from
the foreclosure sale of the Property to the judgment as herein provided.

10.

This judgment shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorneys

fees incurred by Defendant Bill Hart in collecting this judgment, by execution or otherwise, as
shall be established by affidavit.
DATED this

^ 7 day of ' Jjflfr

Approved as to form:

76^L<P.
Christina I Miller, Esq.
David B. Thompson, Esq.
Miller, Vance & Thompson, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff Joel Sill
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Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, Esq.
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C
Attorneys for Third Party Defendant Kallie J. Sill
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ADDENDUM 2

In the Third Judicial District Court
Summit County, State of Utah
JOEL SILL,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
vs.
BILL HART, d/b/a HART
CONSTRUCTION,
Defendant and Third-Party
Plaintiff,

Case No. 020500012
Hon. Deno G. Himonas

vs.
KALLIE J. SILL and DOES IX,
Third-Party Defendants.
From October 13-22, 2004, Defendant and Counterclaimant, Bill Hart d/b/a Bill Hart
Construction ("Hart"), and Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant, Joel Sill ("Sill"), tried this matter
to a jury. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in Hart's favor of $314,500.00
on his unjust enrichment and mechanics' lien claims.
Hart now seeks to reduce the verdict to a judgment. To this end, Hart has filed a Motion for
Entry of Judgment Upon a Verdict and for Decree of Foreclosure, Award of Prejudgment Interest,
Attorney's Fees and Costs (the "Motion"). Sill opposes the Motion on the grounds that (1) "Hart's
lien action is barred" because "Hart failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001)
when he served his counterclaim complaint on Sill;"1 (2) Hart is not entitled to prejudgment interest
and attorney's fees on his unjust enrichment claim; and (3) "Hart is entitled to only a portion of the
costs he claims." Response to Motion, pp. 3 & 8. For the reasons set forth below, the Court is of
the view that Hart's lien claim is valid and that he is entitled to prejudgment interest and attorney's
fees as a result. The Court is also of the view that Hart is entitled to a large part of his costs.

*By stipulation the parties reserved for "post-verdict determination .. . [a]ny issues concerning
Hart's compliance with the statutory requirements for maintaining and enforcing a mechanic's lien."
Response to Motion for Entry of Judgment Upon Verdict and for Decree of Foreclosure, Award of
Prejudgment Interest, Attorney's Fees and Costs ("Response to Motion"), p. 2 (citation and internal
quotations omitted).

ANALYSIS
Sill concedes that Hart is entitled to a judgment of $314,500.00 "for his unjust enrichment
claim." Response to Motion, p. 2. He contests, however, Hart's entitlement to a judgment on his
mechanics' lien claim. The nub of Sill's argument is that when Hart filed his counterclaim, he failed
to comply with the notice requirements set forth in Section 11(4) of Utah's mechanics' lien statute
(Title 38, Chapter 1), which provides in pertinent part as follows:
(4)(a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under
this chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102,
the lien claimant shall include with the service of the complaint on
the owner of the residence: (i) instructions to the owner of the
residence relating to the owner's rights under Title 38, Chapter 11,
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act; and (ii) a
form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable the owner
of the residence to specify the grounds upon which the owner may
exercise available rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act.
(b) The lien claimant may file a notice to submit for decision on the
motion for summary judgment. The motion may be ruled upon after
the service of the summons and complaint upon the nonpaying party,
as defined in Section 3 8-11 -102, and the time for the nonpaying party
to respond,..., has elapsed.
* **

(e) If a lien claimant fails to provide to the owner of the residence the
instructions and form affidavit required by Subsection (4)(a), the lien
claimant shall be barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon
the residence.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(4) (2001)(emphasis added).2 Specifically, Sill argues that Hart never
served him with the instructions and "form affidavit and motion for summary judgment" identified
in Subsection (4)(a) when he filed his counterclaim. He further argues that this failure dooms Hart's
request for prejudgment interest and attorney's fees because Hart is only entitled to the same if he
prevails on his lien claim.
Hart readily admits that he did not serve the papers referenced above on Sill. He also readily
admits that he is not entitled to recover either prejudgment interest or attorney's fees on his unjust
enrichment claim. See, e.g., Motion, pp. 8 & 10-13. But he vigorously disputes the notion that
Subsection (4) applies to this dispute.

2

The parties are in agreement that the mechanics' lien statute in place when Hart filed his
counterclaim (February 2002) governs this dispute. See, e.g., Response to Motion, p. 3 n.l.
2

Both parties acknowledge that Subsection (4) is essentially dispositive of this issue and,
therefore, contend that the Subsection's plain and unambiguous language requires the Court to rule
in their favor. According to Sill, Hart's filing of his counterclaim constituted "fil[ing] an action to
enforce a lien" and triggered the notice obligations set forth in Subsection (4). Not so, according to
Hart; Subsection (4) applies, he asserts, only if a lien claimant "files an action" ajid serves a
"complaint" (versus a counterclaim) on a homeowner. Hart is correct.
"[W]hen interpreting a statute," a court "looks first to the statute's plain language to
determine" legislative intent. Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, f 17, 66 P.3d 592 (citation omitted).
In doing so, it must "read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in
harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related statutes." Id. (citations omitted). And
where the statute is clear, the court must not "assess the wisdom of the legislation," but must
"implement the law as it reads unless it results in an absurd outcome." Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952
P.2d 577, 586 (Utah App. 1998) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
The plain language of Subsection (4) compels the conclusion that the Utah "Legislature
limited the obligation of a lien claimant to serve a homeowner with the materials referenced in
Subsection (4)(a) to those instances in which the lien claimant was initiating an action through
service of a complaint and not a counterclaim. First, while "[t]he word 'action' without more is
arguably broad enough to encompass any type of judicial proceeding, including counterclaims"
(Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers'Int'I v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73, 81 (2nd Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted)), read in the context of Subsection (4), it is qualified by the reference to "service of the
complaint."3 Second, this reference to a complaint is to a pleading that is filed at the commencement
of a lawsuit and that is commonly understood to be distinct from a counterclaim. See, e.g., Local
Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers' Int 7 v. Pelella, 350 F.3d at 82; see also Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure 3 ("A civil action is commenced (1) by filing of a complaint..., or (2) by service of a
summons together with a copy of the complaint") & 7(a) (distinguishing a complaint from other
pleadings). Third, had the Legislature intended Sill's construction, it could have easily provided for
it (e.g., by substituting the words "initial pleading" for "complaint" in Subsection (4)(a)).4

3

Sill argues that the Utah Court of Appeals disposed of this issue in his favor in American Rural
Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Communications Corp., 939 P.2d 185 (Utah App. 1997), when it held that the
word "action" in Section 38-1-18 of the mechanics' lien statute included a counterclaim. Id., p. 193.
Sill's reading ignores that there are no words or phrases in Section 18 that restrict the word "action" in
any way. Indeed, the current statute references "any action." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1). Sill also
ignores that the American Rural Cellular decision is in harmony with the purpose of the mechanics' lien
statute, while his suggested interpretation is not. Infra, pp. 4-5; American Rural Cell, 939 P.2d at 193.
4

Sill counters that the reference to a "summons and complaint" in Subsection (4)(b) is proof that
the Legislature intended the reference to a "complaint" in Subsection (4)(a) be broadly construed. Sill's
conclusion just does not follow. Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a party may not move for
summary judgment until "the expiration of 20 days from commencement of the action." Subsection 4(b)
simply makes clear that the motion for summary judgment identified in Subsection (4)(a) is not subject to
the same restraint.
3

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers'
Intl v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73, is instructive. There, the Second Circuit was confronted with the
question of whether the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA") barred an
employee's counterclaim because it was financed by an "interested employer." Urfder Section
101(a)(4) of the LMRDA, an employee could not "institute an action" that was financed by an
"interested employer." Therefore, the union argued, Pelella could not maintain his employer-backed
counterclaim. The Second Circuit, relying heavily on a decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, disagreed. In doing so it noted that:
[A] defendant does not "institute" an action when he asserts a
counterclaim. Rather, a plaintiff must commence the action by filing
a complaint that names a defendant. This affords the defendant the
ability to file a responsive pleading, namely the answer,..., in which
he can include a claim for relief against the opposing party.
Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers' Int 7, 350 F.3d at 82. The Second Circuit further noted
that this "narrow construction" better comported with legislative purpose, and that the "concerns"
that Section 101(a)(4) "seeks to address'"' were lessened because, "[b]y taking the member to court,
the union itself introduces the outside actor into what once had been an internal grievance and opens
the door to some measure of interference." Id., pp. 84-85.5
Sill counters that in Harman v. Yeagar Et Ux.9 134 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah 1943), the Utah
Supreme Court wrote that "[a] counterclaim is viewed as an original action . . . tested by the same
tests and rules as a complaint." He further counters that Black's Law Dictionary defines "complaint"
to include a counterclaim.6 While these arguments are not without some persuasive value, they do
not carry the day. Moreover, accepting these arguments would only create an ambiguity-an
ambiguity that must be resolved in favor of Hart's construction.
To the extent that a statute is ambiguous, it is appropriate for a court to look beyond its
language and to its legislative history7 and purpose. See Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d
480, 482 (Utah 1980) (citation omitted); State v. Burgess-Benyon, 2004 UT App 312, f 7, 99 P.3d
383 (citation omitted). With respect to the statute at hand, it is well established that its general
purpose is "to provide protection to those who enhance the value of a property by supplying labor
or materials." AAA Fencing Company v. Raintree Development and Energy Company, 714 P.2d 289,
5

In a similar fashion, the concerns that Subsection (4) guards against are lessened when the
homeowner has demonstrated a certain familiarity with the legal process by instituting suit against a lien
claimant.
6

This is a secondary definition. The primary definition, at least according to Black's Law
Dictionary, is "[t]he original or initial pleading by which an action is commenced."
^Because neither party addressed the legislative history of Subsection (4), the Court assumes that
it is either nonexistent or unhelpful.
4

291 (Utah 1986); see also ButterfieldLumbar, Inc. v. Peterson Mortgage Assoc., 815 P.2d 1330,
1334 (Utah 1991).8 That purpose is served by construing Subsection (4) narrowly and consistent
with its plain language, as Hart urges.9
Finally, the Court rejects Sill's alternative challenge to Hart's entitlement to prejudgment
interest and awards Hart the same on his mechanics' lien claim. The Court also awards Hart
attorney's fees (as prayed for and established by affidavit) and costs of suit (as described by the
Court at the January 31, 2005 hearing).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Motion in part and denies it in part. Counsel
for Hart is to prepare, circulate, and submit a Judgment consistent with this Memorandum Decision.
Dated this ^ ^ - d a y of February, 2005, in Summit County, State of Utah.
BY THECOURT:

y / ^ ^ / ^ \

DENO G. HI1VTOW&
DISTRICT COURT J U D G E ^ g

8

It is important to note that "[a] statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is
animated by one general purpose and intent." Miller, 2003 UT at Tf 17 (emphasis added) (citations and
internal quotations omitted).
9

Sill admits that he was not eligible for relief under the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien
Recovery Fund Act. Nevertheless, he urges the Court to adopt an interpretation that would restrict Hart's
ability to recover for an otherwise valid lien based on Hart's failure to provide notice of an irrelevant
statutory provision. While this point is certainly not dispositive, it does help emphasize that Sill's
construction is contrary to the lien law's overarching purpose.
5

